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WAR AND TRADE SYMPOSIUM  
OPENING REMARKS:  
WAR, TRADE, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL 
Nathaniel Berman* 
elcome to the first panel of this symposium on “War and 
Trade.” Our panel, entitled, “The Use of Force and International 
Trade: Complementary or Competing Legal Regimes,” follows in the 
wake of Duncan Kennedy’s timely and provocative keynote address yes-
terday evening on Iraq.  As one of the co-organizers of this symposium, I 
would like very briefly to lay out some of the background ideas that 
guided us in putting it together. 
This symposium originated in our desire to deploy critical thinking on 
some of the conventional wisdom about the international situation since 
1989. Almost all observers seem to agree with the proposition that “in-
ternational-law-has-been-fundamentally-changed-by-post-Cold-War-de-
velopments.”  However, not everyone agrees on precisely which devel-
opments have so thoroughly challenged the traditional structure of inter-
national law. And, above all, far too little thought has been given to the 
relationship between the various sources of the putative challenge to in-
ternational law. 
In conventional debate, there are two leading candidates for the source 
of this challenge. The first is the dramatic transformation in the military 
and security arenas—in short, the changing nature of war; the second is 
economic globalization and the dominance of the neo-liberal economic 
model—in short, the changing nature of trade. 
Let us first consider the war side. A number of rather heterogeneous 
phenomena are often cited as provoking the destabilization of the tradi-
tional conceptualizations of war by political actors, as well as by scholars 
of international law and international relations. For example, the past 
sixteen years have seen the proliferation of civil wars and ethnic conflicts 
rather than traditional armed conflicts between states. They have also 
been a time of the emergence of vast American military predominance (a 
phenomenon perhaps now rendered uncertain by events in Iraq). Finally, 
it has been a period of a medley of other challenges to traditional images 
of war, such as military privatization, transnational terror networks, and 
the specter of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. On the 
economic side, we have neo-liberal economic globalization, powerful 
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transnational economic networks, and trade liberalization, coordinated to 
some extent by the WTO and other international financial institutions. 
Both sets of phenomena, those on the war side and those on the trade 
side, have been said to weaken sovereignty, to render obsolete a number 
of hoary doctrines of international law, and to make international gov-
ernance both indispensable and incredibly difficult. The proliferation of 
“new kinds of war” and the globalization of the economy are both said to 
destabilize the way in which the international system was anchored in 
sovereign states and to diminish the autonomy of states to set their own 
policies. This untethering of the world from its traditional moorings 
seems to create power-vacuums on a number of levels, vacuums filled by 
a variety of new actors: powerful state militaries and economies, interna-
tional organizations like the UN and WTO, and non-state actors like mul-
tinational corporations and transnational military groups. As at all times 
when it has seemed that “all that is solid melts into air,” powerful new 
actors seem once again to be emerging with a variety of projects for re-
structuring the world in their image. 
Nevertheless, I believe that no persuasive account has emerged of the 
relationship between changes in the military and economic arenas, or 
even a rigorous accounting of the many possible similarities and dissimi-
larities between them. And, therefore, over the course of today’s sympo-
sium, I expect that many of the speakers are going to be proceeding on 
the basis of a different set of assumptions about such questions than in 
more conventional discussions.  While not all speakers will agree with 
what follows, I would like to sketch some of the key disagreements that 
many of us have with more familiar accounts. 
First of all, I think many of us are going to challenge the supposed 
novelty of these allegedly “unprecedented challenges to international 
law.” For example, was it always true that sovereignty played the stabi-
lizing role that the conventional account attributes to it? Or has sover-
eignty itself always been a contested political instrument, sometimes re-
inforcing disparities in both military and economic arenas, sometimes 
serving as a basis for challenging those disparities, sometimes producing 
stability, sometimes producing instability? And above all, to the extent 
that it has provided stability, has the legal concept of sovereignty not of-
ten ended up reinforcing Western power in relationship to the rest of the 
world whether in the form of overt, classical colonialism, or in other, 
more subtle, contemporary forms of domination? And, finally, when 
compared with the forcible wrenching of non-Western economies and 
resources into the service of Western economic expansion in the six-
teenth through nineteenth centuries, might not today’s supposed “un-
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precedented economic globalization” appear as something of a historical 
epiphenomenon? 
Secondly, I think many of us proceed from different starting points in 
understanding the relationship between war and trade than those that in-
form conventional discussions of the topic. In classical discussions of the 
topic, we would expect to find questions like the following: do trade 
links have a generally peacemaking effect, or do they tend to bring eco-
nomic competitors into conflict, including military conflict? The first 
view, the one that proclaims the peaceful and even peacemaking nature 
of trade, is often associated both with the classical liberalism of the nine-
teenth century and with the contemporary “liberal peace” school. The 
second position, focusing on the dark, dangerous, bellicose nature of 
trade, is often associated with classical Marxism, especially in the form 
that it took in the early twentieth century in diagnoses of the causes of 
World War I. By contrast, I would expect that for many of the sympo-
sium participants, these kinds of broad debates have been displaced in 
varying degrees by situating the war-trade conundrum in relationship to 
specific patterns of the distribution of power and wealth among states, 
regions, and populations. 
From this alternative optic, before asking about the generally pacifying 
or militarizing effects of trade, one would first ask the question, “war and 
trade among whom?” In particular, one would pay close attention to the 
differences in relations among different Western states, differences be-
tween intra-Western relations and relations between Western states and 
others, and differences in the way Western economic and military domi-
nance has been exercised in different parts of the world. I also expect that 
many of the speakers in this symposium would view the traditional posi-
tions in these debates as often having radically underestimated the com-
plexity of the historical phenomena. On the liberal side, this under-
estimation often takes the form of a tendentious, biased, or, alternatively, 
overly uniform, definition of fundamental terms like “state” or “liberal 
state” —or even “peace.” The “liberal peace” school, for example, seems 
ill-equipped to come to terms with concepts like that of “structural vio-
lence” or “permanent aggression” familiar to theorists of colonialism and 
neo-colonialism. Conversely, Marxist and other leftist frameworks often 
exaggerate the coherence or unity of the self-interest of states and eco-
nomic actors, often failing to consider the tensions among those interests, 
their ambivalence, and the shifting and inconsistent ways in which those 
interests affect policy positions. 
I now wish to sketch some background hypotheses about how things 
might look if one approached these questions from a more critical per-
spective. In particular, I want to use the optic of looking at the way in 
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which the relationship between war and trade has been handled in the 
policy-making circles of Western centers of power both recently and in 
the historical past. This sketch is necessarily going to be reductionist and 
tendentious, for I will analyze Western policies on these issues over the 
past couple of centuries as divisible into two broad impulses—the “drive 
to incorporate” and the “desire to quarantine.” In this analysis, I draw 
heavily on the work of Mark Duffield,1 though I depart from him in a 
variety of ways and absolve him entirely from the reductionist quality of 
the following analysis. 
The “drive to incorporate” refers to the urge to incorporate the non-
Western world into the Western military and economic system. This 
drive may take the form of using military power to drive the non-West 
into the Western economic system. Conversely, it may take the form of 
using economic power to drive the non-West into the Western military 
system. By contrast, the “desire to quarantine” refers to the aspiration to 
cordon off, as far as possible, the non-incorporated world so as not to 
disrupt military and economic relationships in the West. The drive to 
incorporate and the desire to quarantine are thus opposite policy im-
pulses—though actual policy in any given period may reflect an ambiva-
lence about the non-West and hence may oscillate between the two im-
pulses. I caution to add that these positions are not necessarily associated 
with predictable political positions. Each one has been identified at vari-
ous times with the political left and the political right. 
The drive to incorporate was, of course, most starkly embodied in clas-
sical colonialism. As one of our symposium participants, Antony Anghie, 
has written, “Trade and civilization have been the principal justifications 
for the colonial project through the centuries.”2 Anghie has demonstrated 
in great detail3 the ways that modern international law from its inception, 
as well as colonialist practice, made war and peace dependent on submis-
sion by non-Europeans to certain kinds of European economic activity. 
As I have mentioned, this kind of thinking was not always associated 
with the political affiliations that one might expect. For example, classi-
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cal European colonialism was, at times, the project of the left—at least 
the center left, often called the “socialist left” in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. Perhaps even more surprising to non-
specialists, colonialism was, at times, opposed by the traditionalist right 
wing, concerned with colonialism’s negative effect on social and eco-
nomic hierarchy in Europe as well as in the places that the Europeans 
were trying to colonize, such as India. Thus, at some moments, incorpo-
rationism was a European center-left project and quarantine a right-wing 
project. At other times, of course, colonialism was the project of the right 
wing and opposed by those on the social democratic left who were con-
cerned by its negative effect on the resources available to build the wel-
fare state at home. 
I now shift from classical colonialism to rather more recent times. Dur-
ing the Cold War, the drive to incorporation characterized policy on both 
the military and economic planes. Such policies took a number of differ-
ent forms. At times, incorporation into the Western economic trading 
system was a reward given to countries in exchange for military alliance, 
or in exchange for other kinds of military actions, such as the adoption 
by target countries of repressive measures in relationship to their own 
population. Conversely, at other times military alliance was a reward 
given in exchange for economic and trading benefits. Here too we find 
unpredictable political associations and ambiguities. For example, a tight 
link between trade ties and military alliance was often a liberal Democ-
ratic project in the United States. Thus, in the John F. Kennedy admini-
stration, there was a close link between the “Alliance for Progress,” a 
trade and development economic project, and military alliances against 
the left in Latin America. The rejection of incorporationism and a move 
towards a desire to quarantine became a populist and left project in the 
wake of Vietnam, and re-emerged later in the Naderite left. 
The first phase of the post-Cold War period, from 1989–2001, saw 
both continuities and discontinuities with the Cold War. On the one 
hand, Cold War-style drives to incorporate the rest of the world both 
militarily and economically continued in relationship to certain countries 
and at certain times. On the other hand, the desire to quarantine prevailed 
in relationship to other countries and at other times. The vicissitudes of 
foreign policy debates in the Democratic Party can be viewed as an oscil-
lation between these drives. Some Democrats were incorporationists in 
both the trade and military arenas, favoring both economic globalization 
coordinated by institutions like the WTO and military interventions like 
those in Haiti and Kosovo. Others only favored incorporationism in the 
economic arena, preferring policies of quarantine in military matters. The 
change in policy toward the Balkans between 1992 and 1995 may be 
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viewed as a gradual move from quarantine to incorporation. Still a third 
sector of the Democratic Party sought quarantine in both economic and 
military matters, in the form of economic protectionism and hostility to 
military intervention abroad. 
Despite these complexities, one may draw a rough contrast between the 
Cold War and post-Cold War periods. The Cold War protagonists oper-
ated on the basis of a drive to incorporate as much of the globe into their 
respective camps as possible. By contrast, post-Cold War Western policy 
often seemed based much more on a willingness to measure interests in 
peripheral areas on a case-by-case basis, particularly from a security-
based optic. When peripheral regions were perceived as presenting secu-
rity threats, the drive to incorporate often prevailed on both military and 
economic fronts. When peripheral regions were perceived as not present-
ing security challenges, and this was often the case in relation to Africa, 
Western powers sought to wall off those areas from disturbing the mili-
tary and economic relationships in the center. The security focus of much 
of this case-by-case evaluation, and the disagreements on what conclu-
sions to draw from such a focus, go far to explain the oscillation between 
interventionism and non-interventionism during the 1989–2001 period. 
After 9/11, one might have predicted that the new conditions of global 
fracturing and competition would unambiguously revive the predomi-
nance of the “drive for incorporation” characteristic of much of the Cold 
War. Indeed, some very influential opinion-makers of the “liberal peace 
school,” such as the journalist Tom Friedman and his academic homo-
logues, urged that post-9/11 policy be structured by a tight link between 
security and trade—a very similar approach to that which prevailed dur-
ing the Cold War. Others, for example those in the extremist Bu-
chananite right wing, urged that 9/11 indicated that the United States 
should seek to quarantine itself from the rest of the world. Such observ-
ers argued that the United States should continue the stance proclaimed 
by the 2000 Bush campaign in rejecting incorporationism either on the 
security or economic planes, or both. 
The militarization of U.S. policy after 9/11 reshuffled many of the ex-
pectations inherited from the policies and practices of the late 1990s. For 
example—a very striking and central example—the move from imposing 
sanctions on Iraq to invading Iraq was clearly a move from quarantine to 
incorporation. The Bush sector of the American right wing converted 
from neo-isolationism to a kind of grotesque transmogrification of Wil-
sonian internationalism. In this light, it is not surprising that many of the 
prominent initial actions taken by the U.S.-occupation administration in 
Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority, focused on making Iraq into an 
extreme example of economic neo-liberalism. These measures entailed 
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abolition of barriers to foreign investment and to foreign trade, and mak-
ing Iraq generally available for incorporation into the Western economic 
system—for example, facilitating its eventual entry into the WTO. 
And with these reflections, I conclude this extremely schematic sketch 
of an alternative framework for thinking about the relationship between 
war and trade in Western policy circles over the past couple of centuries. 
I think that something like this framework will inform many of the talks 
that you will hear today. Of course, since this is a meeting of interna-
tional law scholars, I expect that most of the actual talks will not be at 
this broad level of historical speculation, but rather at the level of the 
detail of legal regimes. For example, I would expect the speakers to ad-
dress the similarities and dissimilarities between the international legal 
regimes for trade and war at the level of doctrinal and institutional detail. 
Similarly, I would expect them to address, at a micro-level of historical 
and regional specificity, the question of whether the international legal 
regimes for trade and war facilitate each other, or compete with each 
other. And, finally, I would expect them to address the question of 
whether the international legal regimes for trade and war have similar or 
dissimilar impacts on the unequal global distribution of power and 
wealth. 
In general, I expect that these analyses will examine the way particular 
legal regimes operate, and the way particular legal rules provide back-
ground norms against which both military and economic activity takes 
place. Moreover, I expect today’s speakers to address the ways legal dis-
course plays an ideological role in society at large, legitimating the de-
ployment of economic and military power, making unjust distributions of 
power and wealth seem natural or inevitable, and foreclosing the imagi-
nation of alternative ways of making the world. 
The need for more complex analyses of the relationship between war 
and trade should be particularly compelling for specialists in interna-
tional law. Both trade and war have often been viewed as quasi-natural, 
pre-legal phenomena, or, alternatively, as extra-legal phenomena in rela-
tionship to which law can only play an ineffective or counterproductive 
role. Yet the events of our era have demonstrated powerfully that law is 
thoroughly implicated in structuring both economic and military activity. 
Indeed, they have shown that trade and war as we understand and prac-
tice them are inconceivable without the background framework provided 
by law. Law is deeply involved in the construction of the difference be-
tween trade and war, both at the level of general conceptions of the two 
spheres, and at the level of the changing policies designed to manage 
their inter-relationship. 
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At the broadest level, the hypothesis guiding my own participation in 
this project is that the notion of “the international” as we know it might 
be an artifact of legal constructions of the relationship between war and 
trade. These constructions are historically contingent, politically contest-
able, and often incoherent or internally contradictory. And yet, it is pre-
cisely by identifying their malleability that we might regain hope of 
imagining new ways of organizing the world even in the deepening 
gloom of the times in which we live. 
On a final note, whether or not all the participants in the symposium 
will recognize the assumptions I’ve outlined here as guiding their own 
work, I can confidently say one thing: the talks you will hear today will 
not be lacking in challenges to the conventional wisdom on these topics, 
in intellectual and historical depth, and, above all, in legal, political, 
moral, and even aesthetic imagination. 
 
